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1. Introduction 
Pelé knows how to play soccer; Anne-Sophie Mutter knows how to play the 
violin; and Michael Schumacher knows how to drive a car. All three have 
performed these activities successfully, over a long span of time, on a profes-
sional level. These kinds of human activity give credibility to the widely held 
idea that persons who know how to perform an action possess a stable disposi-
tion that enables them to successfully perform this action under certain, suit-
able conditions. Such a stable disposition to perform an intentional action is a 
practical ability or skill of a person. If knowledge-how is an ability, and there-
fore a dispositional property, then there is a form of knowledge that consists 
of a relation between a person and a practical ability. There are, however, 
other forms of knowledge than knowledge-how; there is, for instance, knowl-
edge-that, a form much investigated by philosophers since Plato. Knowledge-
that, however, does not express any relation between a person and a practical 
ability, but rather a relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition. 
In regard to the above distinctions, two questions arise, which episte-
mologists have discussed for quite some time, at least ever since Gilbert Ryle 
attempted to sort out these issues. 
Question 1: Is it at all true that someone who knows how to do some-
thing is disposed to perform an action under favorable conditions? Is knowl-
edge-how a practical ability? Or is knowledge-how rather a hidden knowl-
edge-that, and therefore also a relation between an epistemic subject and a 
proposition? Within the last few years, an influential article by Stanley and 
Williamson, who defend the intellectualist thesis that every type of knowledge 
_____________
1 First and foremost I would like to thank Rainer Enskat and Eli Trautwein for extensive conver-
sations and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Further thanks go to Dirk Effertz, 
Vittorio Hösle, Robert Schnepf, Dieter Schönecker, Karsten Stüber, and audiences in Witten-
berg, Halle, Iowa, Notre Dame, Cologne, and Lucerne for helpful questions. 
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is a knowledge-that,2 has stimulated a debate. In order to answer the first 
question complex appropriately one has to take into account the semantic-
pragmatic aspects of the use and meanings of the term ‘knowledge-how’ and its 
grammatical variations as well as the nature of knowledge-how. 
Question 2: What is the connection between knowledge-how and knowl-
edge-that? Is knowledge-how a form of knowledge in its own right, inde-
pendent of knowledge-that, is it subordinate to knowledge-that, or is knowl-
edge-that subordinate to it? Thus, the second question complex is aimed at 
determining the correlation between knowledge-how and knowledge-that; as 
well as the possible function that dispositional knowledge can have in the 
sphere of propositional knowledge. 
I will deal with both questions in the course of my paper. In the first part, 
I argue that the term ‘knowledge-how’ is an ambiguous term in a semantic-
pragmatic sense, blending two distinct meanings: ‘knowledge-how’ in the 
sense of knowledge-that, and ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of an ability. In 
the second part of my paper, I construe five alternative ways of correlating 
knowledge-that and knowledge-how in the sense of an ability. I will discuss 
each of these alternatives and will then argue in favor of one of them. For this 
purpose, I will develop a reductio ad absurdum argument which is very dif-
ferent from the one that Ryle constructed.3 This argument will show that 
knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that but rather that knowledge-
that is a species of knowledge-how. More specifically, dispositional knowl-
edge-how is at the core of propositional knowledge-that and accordingly 
should be understood to be at the center of epistemology. The general intel-
lectualist assumption that all knowledge-how is a knowledge-that is as false as 
its opposite, that is, the anti-intellectualist assumption that no knowledge-how 
is a knowledge-that. The truth lies rather in the middle: many forms of 
knowledge-how are propositional knowledge-that, but some forms of knowl-
edge-how are purely dispositional abilities. Since the main point of my paper 
will be the proof that every knowledge-that presupposes a certain disposi-
tional knowledge-how, I primarily understand my thesis as a solution to the 
problem of construing the functional role of dispositional knowledge-how in 
relation to propositional knowledge-that.  
_____________
2 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (Stanley/Williamson 2001) have recently maintained, 
(taking their cue from Gilbert Ryle’s reflections on the ‘intellectualist legend’ [Ryle 1945/6 and 
1949, 30-31]) that knowledge-how has been incorrectly understood as an independent form of 
knowing, more specifically as an ability, when it is, on the contrary, nothing but a species of 
knowledge-that. 
3 Ryle 1945/6 and Ryle 1949, 30-31. 
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2. Two Kinds of Knowledge 
Syntactically the verb ‘to know’ in English permits very different sentential 
complements. One can, for example, know that such-and-such is the case. But 
one can also know where something is, when something occurred, who has 
something, what someone has, where someone comes from, where someone is 
going to, why, whatever … for, and how come something happens, how high or how 
long something is, how fast someone runs, and so on. These examples of 
knowledge sentences containing embedded questions seem to be very inti-
mately related to knowledge-that, in that they seem, like knowledge-that, to 
express a relation between an epistemic agent and a proposition or fact.4 To 
briefly clarify this point, take the following two examples: If someone says, 
she knows where St. Peter’s Cathedral is located, she in fact is saying nothing 
more than that she knows that St. Peter’s is located at such-and-such a location.
And if someone says, he knows, how tall the Eiffel Tower is, he is saying noth-
ing more than he knows that the Eiffel Tower has this or that height. These two 
small transformations of a knowing-where- and a knowing-how-statement 
into a knowing-that-statement can be performed analogously with the just 
mentioned types of knowledge sentences. Has the common core of knowl-
edge statements thus been found? Is every knowing a hidden knowledge-that? 
Things get more complicated if another sentential complement of ‘to 
know’ is taken into account: knowing how to do something. Although this expres-
sion, looked at syntactically, also contains the knowledge predicate and an 
embedded question, which begins with ‘how’ – like the expression ‘know how 
tall the Eiffel Tower is’ – there are cases in English where, in sentences of the 
type ‘I know how such-and-such is done,’ we do not want to express a relation 
between an epistemic agent and a proposition, but a relation of a conscious 
agent to a set of personal dispositions or abilities to successfully complete acts.5 If this 
non-propositional form of knowledge is admitted, a search for a uniform defini-
tion of the term ‘knowledge,’ which should be the goal of the theory of 
knowledge, has first to answer the above questions about the nature of 
knowledge-how. Thus, every search for a definition of knowledge must ad-
dress the following two questions: first, what is knowledge-how and second, 
what is the connection between knowledge-how and knowledge-that?6 We 
_____________
4 Cf. Karttunen 1977. 
5 The Greek noun episteme, that gives epistemology its name ‘theory of knowledge,’ has a meaning 
in the sense of knowledge, how something is done, and in the sense of knowledge, that such-and-
such is the case. Cf. Liddell/Scott 1996, 660: “acquaintance with a matter, understanding, skill… 
2. professional skill… II. generally knowledge… 2. scientific knowledge, science…” For Plato’s 
types of knowledge see Damschen 2003. 
6 Only recently has interest in these questions returned more intensively subsequent to Gilbert 
Ryles exemplary reflections in his “Knowing How and Knowing That” (Ryle 1945/6) and in his 
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will see that we can answer the second question without already having a 
comprehensive answer to the first question.  
3. An Ambiguity in the Term ‘Knowledge-How’ 
There is a distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing 
that something is the case. This distinction is not merely syntactic; thus one 
cannot analyze it by analyzing the syntax of the embedded indirect questions 
in knowledge statements. The distinction I have in mind is a semantic-
pragmatic one. For ‘knowing how’ is specifically used to express the relation 
between an epistemic agent and a set of dispositions or abilities, and not the 
relation between an epistemic agent and a proposition. In order to decide 
whether a speaker’s use of a ‘knowing how’ phrase corresponds to our ca-
nonical explanation of the phrase (that is, expressing the relation of an agent 
to an ability) one should substitute the phrase “knowing how to do such-and-
such” with expressions such as “able to do such-and-such” or “disposed to do 
such-and-such.” If the speaker accepts the substitution, we can assume that 
he does not equate knowing how, here, with knowing that. The truth condi-
tions for a sentence like “I know how one should play the violin” consist in 
the fact that the speaker, who makes this claim, possesses in fact the practical 
skill to play the violin and, under suitable conditions, plays the violin success-
fully. I call this type of non-propositional knowledge-how in the following 
‘dispositional knowledge-how’. French, German, or Latin speakers have their 
own native syntactic construction available to form equivalents to the English 
dispositional knowledge-how phrase, ‘I know how to do this.’ In these three 
languages, the verb ‘to know’ is joined to an expanded infinitive clause: ‘Je sais 
faire quelque chose,’ ‘Ich weiß, das-und-das zu tun,’ ‘aliquid facere scio.’7 German 
speakers explicitly refer to a ‘Wissen-zu,’ [knowledge-to] when they mean 
knowledge-how in the sense of a practical ability. Since the aim of epistemol-
ogy is to study knowledge in general and not merely knowledge constructions 
capable of being expressed in the knowledge predicate in English syntax, we 
must take syntactical information obtained from other languages very seri-
ously. The above substitution test shows very clearly that, in English too, the 
expression ‘knowledge-how’ can refer to something which is not a knowl-
edge-that. 
_____________
The Concept of Mind (Ryle 1949). For example the former question was most recently analyzed by 
Hawley 2003 and Enskat 2005, and the latter by Stanley/Williamson 2001, Koethe 2002, Enskat 
1998, 2003, 2005, Damschen 2005, Noë 2005, Hetherington 2006, Bengson/Moffett 2007, Liho-
reau 2008, Williams 2008, and Adams 2009. Another approach which remains valuable is that of 
Polanyi 1958. 
7 Cf. Rumfitt 2003.  
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Accordingly, there are modes of use of the verb ‘knowing-how’ by means 
of which the speaker expresses that he possesses a practical ability. The op-
ponents of the view that there is knowledge-how which is a practical skill, 
however, do not yet admit defeat. They often propose a counter-argument 
like the following:8 Let us assume that a master violinist like Anne-Sophie 
Mutter knows how one should play the violin. She has sufficiently often 
played the violin in the past, so that we are entitled to make this ascription. 
Let us assume furthermore that she lost both hands in a bad accident. Then 
we have the case of a violinist who does know how one should play the violin 
but is actually unable to play the violin. According to the opponents of dispo-
sitional knowledge-how, this case clearly shows that to know how one per-
forms an action is not the same as to have an ability to perform the action, for 
there are cases in which someone does know how one performs a certain 
action, but does not possess the corresponding ability. 
I doubt that this example or similar examples of this type support the 
view that knowledge-how is not the same as having an ability. Of course, 
there may be the case where Anne-Sophie-Mutter knows how to play the 
violin and nevertheless is not able to play the violin at the moment, because 
she is sleeping at the moment or because no violin is available, although she 
would like to play it. Nobody, however, would therefore claim that Anne-
Sophie Mutter, in these periods of time, lost her ability to play the violin, and 
then regains it suddenly by means of a miraculous act when she wakes up or a 
violin appears. Neither of these two cases shows in any way that to know how 
one should play the violin is not the ability to play the violin. The same con-
siderations also apply to the case where Anne-Sophie Mutter loses both 
hands: a situation that is logically comparable to the case where no violin is 
available at the moment. In both cases does she know how to play the violin 
and possesses an ability to play the violin without being able to play the violin 
at that very moment. The realization of an ability always presupposes certain 
conditions that must be satisfied so that the ability can be carried out success-
fully. These conditions can be external conditions that do not have to do with 
the bearer of the ability, e.g. the lack of a violin when one wants to play the 
violin. However, these conditions also can be conditions that are connected 
with the body of the bearer of an ability, e.g. if a violinist has lost both hands 
or, to assume a less drastic case, has perhaps such a strong influenza that she 
cannot hold the violin.9
Practical knowledge and practical abilities have, therefore, four important 
properties:10 
_____________
8 Cf. Stanley/Williamson 2001, 416. 
9 Cf. Noë 2005, 282-283. 
10  Cf. Noë 2005, 284-286. 
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1. They are always the knowledge of someone, i. e., they are the knowl-
edge of a person. In this regard, one can call them personal knowledge. For 
practical abilities do not exist independently, but require a bearer who is able 
to perform intentional actions. 
2. The second property of practical knowledge is connected directly with 
its first property. Normal abilities are embodied. I presume that persons who we 
know have a body. I do not want to commit myself to the view that there are 
no persons without bodies. But it is true anyway that the cases of knowledge-
how, which we look at, are always cases where the bearer of a knowledge-how 
is a person who has a body. The acquisition of practical skills changes our 
body and we perform our skills by means of our body. 
3. The third property of practical knowledge is that it is situated. Disposi-
tional knowledge can only be realized if certain external conditions are ful-
filled. Pelé cannot play soccer if no football is available, and Michael 
Schumacher cannot drive any formula-one car if its tires are slashed. Basically, 
every proposition like ‘Somebody S knows how one X-s’ has to be completed 
in the following way: ‘Somebody S knows how to X under circumstances C.’ 
4. The fourth property of practical knowledge is to be disposed to per-
form an action successfully. If Anne-Sophie Mutter cannot successfully play the 
violin or if Michael Schumacher cannot successfully compete in a car race, 
one could neither say of Mutter that she knows how one should play the 
violin nor of Schumacher that he knows how one should race cars. 
So, knowledge-how is a personal, embodied and situated ability to suc-
cessfully realize an action. Our analysis thus has shown that there are manifes-
tations of ‘knowledge-how’ that are instantiated when someone possesses a 
practical ability. 
The above canonical instances of ‘knowing how’ (that is, knowing how as 
an ability) are, however, not the whole story. For, confusingly, in English and 
in the other languages mentioned, there is a second, completely different use 
of the expression ‘knowledge-how’ with which a relation between an epis-
temic agent and a proposition can, indeed, be expressed. Again, our semantic 
test is quite simple. One must ask the speaker who says ‘I know how one 
does such-and-such’ whether the statement he makes can be rendered 
straightforwardly and without distortion as ‘I know, that one must do such-
and-such in order to act in this or that manner.’ If he affirms this, then he 
wants to say that he is the carrier of a propositional knowledge-how. Further-
more, if the speaker is able to list a sequence of appropriate steps to act in this 
or that manner he is indeed a carrier of such propositional knowledge-how. 
Thus, depending on the intention of the speaker, sentences such as  
 
(1) I know how to drive a car 
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can have firstly (1a) a non-propositional and dispositional meaning, e.g. as the 
answer of an active driver to the question of whether he has the ability to 
drive a car successfully. Yet, secondly the sentence can also have (1b) a pro-
positional meaning, e.g. as the answer of a driving instructor to the question 
whether he can articulate in propositional form the actions necessary to con-
trol a car, the relevant theoretical knowledge, and the most important rules of 
the road. Finally the sentence can thirdly (1c) have both meanings simultane-
ously, i.e. the dispositional and the propositional, e.g. as the answer of a driv-
ing instructor to the question whether he himself is able to drive a car and 
whether he also can communicate to his students in propositional form every-
thing that one has to do in the process.11 The last sense of knowledge-how in 
the sense of a hybrid between dispositional and propositional knowledge-how 
is the meaning that one comes across most frequently as David Lewis accu-
rately observed: “It would be feeble, I think, just to say that we’re fooled by 
the ambiguity of the word ‘know’: we confuse ability with information be-
cause we confuse knowledge in the sense of knowing-how with knowledge in 
the sense of knowing-that. There may be two senses of the word ‘know,’ but 
they are well and truly entangled. They mark the two pure endpoints of a 
range of mixed cases. The usual thing is that we gain information and ability 
together. If so, it should be no surprise if we apply to pure cases of gaining 
ability, or to pure cases of gaining information, the same word ‘know’ that we 
apply to all the mixed cases.”12 
Thus, we have three instances of knowledge-how. To keep them easily 
apart in the following, I will use subscripts to distinguish between them:  
 
(a) knowledge-howd, that is dispositional and non-propositional 
knowing how; 
(b) knowledge-howp, that is knowing how that can be articulated in 
terms of propositions;
(c) knowledge-howh, that is knowing how as hybrid.
It was no doubt the propositional use of knowledge-howp or knowledge-howh
which led philosophers to their general claim that every knowledge-how is a 
_____________
11  To formulate this insight more precisely I give the relevant truth conditions for each of the three 
cases: 
(1a) (1) is true iff the speaker of the sentence (1) has the personal ability to successfully drive a 
car. 
(1b) (1) is true iff the speaker of the sentence (1) explicitly knows that one must do such-and-
such to drive a car. 
(1c) (1) is true iff both (1a) and (1b) are met. 
12  Lewis 1999, here p. 289. 
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knowledge-that.13 For the purpose of this paper it is only important to recog-
nize that the dispositional form of knowledge-how in the sense of a practical 
ability (knowledge-howd) exists.14
4. Five Alternative Answers 
Asking whether and how knowledge-how in the dispositional sense (know-
lege-howd) and knowlege-that in the propositional sense are semantically 
related yields the following five alternatives: 
 
(A1) Knowledge-howd is a species of knowledge-that, i.e.: 
knowledge-that is a necessary condition for knowledge-howd.
(A2) Knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-howd, i.e.: 
knowledge-howd is a necessary condition for knowledge-that. 
(A3) Knowledge-howd and knowledge-that are extensionally equivalent. 
(A4) Knowledge-howd and knowledge-that have a common intersection. 
(A5) Knowledge-howd and knowledge-that are completely distinct. 
 
These five alternative ways of thinking about the relation between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that correspond to alternative strategies in looking for a 
definition of knowledge.15 (S1) If we think of all forms of knowledge as pro-
positional knowledge, we must be convinced of having found a good argu-
ment for alternative A1.16 (S2) On the other hand, if we opt for alternative 
A2, we must place the search for a definition of knowledge-how at the center 
of our epistemological reflections; knowledge-that would then only be a spe-
_____________
13  E.g. Hintikka 1975, or Stanley/Williamson 2001. 
14  Cf. on this also Ryle 1949, Rumfitt 2003, Rosefeldt 2004, Noë 2005, 284, Lihoreau 2008, and 
Williams 2008. 
15  Asking whether and how knowledge-how in the propositional sense (knowledge-howp) and 
knowledge-that in the propositional sense are semantically related yields at least the following al-
ternatives: 
(B1) Knowledge-howp is a species of knowledge-that.  
(B2) Knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-howp.
(B3) Knowledge-howp and knowledge-that are extensionally equivalent. 
(B4) Knowledge-howp and knowledge-that have a common intersection. 
(B5) Knowledge-howp and knowledge-that are completely distinct. 
Although alternative B1 seems to be the right answer, deciding this claim is not the subject of 
this paper. 
16  Cf. e.g. Hintikka 1975, 3: “… all of the different constructions in terms of the verb ‘know’ can 
be reduced … to the sense in which the nature of knowledge as a propositional attitude is most 
explicit … the ‘knowing-that’.” 
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cies or subcategory of knowledge-how.17 (S3) If we choose alternative A3, we 
must stipulate that an extensional definition of knowledge-that be identical 
with an extensional definition of knowledge-how. (S4) Alternative A4 pre-
sents us with a non-uniform definition for the term ‘knowledge’ encompass-
ing three equally valid and distinct definitions of a form of pure knowledge-
that, a form of pure knowledge-how and a mixed form of the two. (S5) Fi-
nally, alternative A5 like A4 presents us with a non-uniform definition of the 
term ‘knowledge’ entailing two, rather than three, equally valid and distinct 
definitions of knowledge-how and knowledge-that. 
Most epistemologists, without always stating it explicitly or perhaps hav-
ing consciously thought about it, follow strategy S1 or S5. But no matter, our 
reflections up to this point have shown that those who would like to provide 
a definition of knowledge can only begin their work in a methodologically 
controlled manner if they have found at least one good argument for one of 
the five listed alternatives and, at the same time, good arguments against the 
remaining four alternatives. 
Unfortunately there have been only few arguments which could make the 
decision between these five alternatives easier. The most familiar argument 
against alternative A1 is Gilbert Ryle’s argument against what he calls the 
‘intellectualist legend’.18 As we have seen, Ryle’s “intellectualist legend” argu-
ment against A1 has recently been disputed by Stanley and Williamson.19 
However, their argument for A1 is not satisfactory.20 For it is mainly based on 
unconvincing linguistic reflections regarding the syntactic relatedness of 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that sentence constructions in the English 
language,21 which cannot support a broader metaphysical project of finding a 
general definition of knowledge.22 For alternative A5 there have been weakly 
plausible arguments, genealogically rooted in Ryle’s original argument.23 There 
have also been a few arguments for saying – vide alternative A2 – that some-
_____________
17  Cf. e.g. Colin McGinn [McGinn 1984], here p. 529: “And once we take on the responsibility of 
confronting the whole family of knowledge locutions, it is by no means guaranteed that proposi-
tional knowledge will emerge as fundamental: perhaps the core notion will attach most directly 
to some other locution, so that knowledge-that comes out as a species of some more basic type 
of knowledge.” 
18  Ryle 1945/6 and Ryle 1949, 30-31. 
19  Stanley/Williamson 2001, 412-417. Whether their reconstruction in fact grasps Ryle’s original 
argument will have to remain untreated here. Cf. on this Rosefeldt 2004 and Noë 2005. 
20  See Stanley/Williamson 2001, 417-444. 
21  See Rumfitt 2003. 
22  Furthermore their concept of knowledge-how as a relation between an epistemic agent and 
practical propositions leads to unacceptable consequences. See Koethe 2002 and Schiffer 2002. 
23  Cf. e.g. Carr 1979; Carr 1981; Devitt 1996, 52; Putnam 1996, xvi; Lewis 1999, 288.  
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one who knows that p has the capacity to state correctly that p.24 However, 
these claims fail since we can imagine someone who, stating that p, is really 
just guessing that p is the case. If, by chance, p is actually the case, he correctly 
states that p and a fortiori he has the capacity to state correctly that p, but we 
would not say that he knows that p. Moreover, if having a capacity to state p
correctly involves reasons for p, these reasons will contain propositional 
knowledge-that. Thus, any reducing of knowledge-that to knowledge-how will 
prove to be circular.25 I have found no explicit arguments for assumptions A3 
or A4 in the philosophical literature.  
I will now introduce a new argument against A1 which, in a very broad 
sense, follows in the tradition of Ryle’s original argument. I, however, will 
make use of very different premises. I try to accomplish two objectives with 
my argument: First, as a reductio ad absurdum it shows that the claim that 
dispositional knowledge-howd is a species of knowledge-that is untenable; 
second, using the first and the last of its premises we can construct a hypo-
thetical syllogism that shows that knowledge-that is a subcategory of disposi-
tional knowledge-howd.
5. The Species-of-Knowledge Argument 
The argument against alternative A1, which I call the species-of-knowledge 
argument, leads formally speaking to a reductio ad absurdum. It thus includes 
premise A1, which will be refuted, and two other premises P1 and P2: 
 
(P1) For all epistemic agents S, for all intentional acts F: If S regularly and 
successfully completes the intentional act F (which S completed ear-
lier sufficiently often, regularly and successfully), then S knows how 
to complete act F.
(A1) For all epistemic agents S, for all intentional acts F, there is at least 
one proposition T: If S knows how to complete act F, S knows that 
T(F). 
(P2) For all epistemic agents S, for all propositions T, there is at least one 
intentional analysis act U: If S knows that T, then S completed the in-
tentional analysis act U sufficiently often, regularly, and successfully, 
whether T is the case, or whether not-T is the case. 
 
_____________
24  Hartland-Swann 1956 and 1957, Roland 1958. For a new argument for assumption A2 see now 
also Hetherington 2006. 
25  See the critique on Hartland-Swann by Ammerman 1957.  
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Let us start with premise A1 that in the end will be refuted with the help of 
the species-of-knowledge argument. According to A1, any knowledge how act 
F is completed can be traced back to the attitude of knowledge in relation to 
the contents of a specific practical proposition T(F). This practical proposi-
tion T(F) states, that such-and-such must be done to complete act F. Accord-
ingly, knowing how to do F would be nothing but to know that such-and-
such must be done in order to do F. But this would imply that every knowl-
edge-how would be nothing but a kind of knowledge-that. 
Premise P1 states a sufficient, not a necessary condition for dispositional 
knowledge-howd. Even though a comprehensive definition of knowledge-
howd continues to be a desideratum,26 for the purpose of the current argu-
ment it is not necessary to have such a definition at hand. Premise P1 can be 
made plausible as follows: it can be straightforwardly admitted that someone 
who was sufficiently often engaged regularly and successfully in an intentional 
act F, also has the ability to complete act F. The practice of a regular and 
successful act is a sufficient condition for a person having the corresponding 
ability. The condition that it must involve an intentional, i.e. intentional and 
consciously planned act, rules out activities performed by robots or non-
personal entities. For none of us would say that a robot in a strict sense 
‘knows’d how to do such-and-such. It may certainly have a disposition to-
wards doing something very specific, but a knowledge-howd seems to be 
more than a mere disposition to do something. It seems also to involve at 
least a relation of the agent to himself, his disposition, and his conscious act. 
For our earlier analysis has suggested that knowledge-how is a personal, em-
bodied and situated ability to successfully realize an action. 
However, the reason premise P1 contains the explicit condition that only 
an adequately large number and only a successful realization of intentional 
actions can be sufficient for the ascription of a knowledge-how is a response to 
the objection of some philosophers (most notably, Stanley and Williamson) 
that the fact that someone performs a non-intentional action does not imply 
that he has a knowledge-how. Stanley and Williamson discuss the following 
example: 
 
(2) If Hannah digests food, she knows how to digest food.27 
And they assert that the proposition is false for the following reasons: “Di-
gesting food is not the sort of action one knows how to do.” I agree in a 
certain way: Indeed, Hannah cannot know how to digest food. But the reason 
for that is not (as Stanley and Williamson assert) that digesting food is a spe-
_____________
26  See Hawley 2003 and Williams 2008. 
27  Stanley/Williamson 2001, 414. 
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cial and mysterious sort of non-intentional action in Hannah for which a 
corresponding knowledge-how does not exist. The reason is simply the fact 
that digesting food in Hannah is not an action that Hannah performs or could 
perform at all: neither a ‘non-intentional action’ (whatever this may be) nor an 
intentional action. It is not Hannah who digests food but her digestive sys-
tem, and in fact in her and for her.28 Neither digesting nor breathing nor the 
process of metabolism is something a person can actively do. These processes 
take place in and for persons, but they are not performed by persons as ac-
tions. In this regard, the funny thing about the proposition “If Hannah di-
gests food, she knows how to digest food” seems to be that it is true, for the 
antecedent of the proposition is false, because it is not Hannah who digests 
the food. There are additional examples of this type, such as the one in which 
Hannah buys lottery tickets and wins. The proposition that is supposed to 
show that there are actions that do not imply any knowledge-how is as fol-
lows: 
 
(3) If Hannah wins a fair lottery, she still does not know how to win the 
lottery, since it was by sheer chance that she did so. 
 
Admittedly, there is probably no knowledge how one wins the lottery, but 
Hannah here does not perform an action which is sufficient for a knowledge-
how. For to win the lottery is not an action Hannah could perform. Hannah 
is able to perform many actions: She can go to the lottery shop, she can buy a 
lottery ticket. However, winning the lottery is not an action Hannah can ac-
tively perform, but rather an event that happens to Hannah. In this respect, 
this example does not show that there are actions that do not presuppose any 
knowledge-how, because it fails to meet the condition that the actions should 
be (intentional) actions of a person.29 
Of course, there are actions which do not imply knowledge-how. These 
are frequently actions that are performed in acquiring a new ability. For ex-
ample, the sentence “Arma virumque cano Troiae qui primus ab oris Italiam 
fato profugus Laviniaque venit litora” could be correctly pronounced purely 
by chance by the beginning Latin student. The action is thus successfully 
performed from the perspective of a third person, but perhaps the lucky Latin 
student cannot consistently reproduce his correct pronunciation. But if the 
speaker successfully and correctly pronounces the sentence “Arma virumque 
cano Troiae qui primus ab oris…” – not only on a single day, but for a longer 
period of time, not only in a single situation, but in various situations, not 
only this sentence of the language, but also additional sentences – then we 
_____________
28  Cf. Noë 2005, 279. 
29  Cf. Noë 2005, 280. 
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can assume that he has acquired the ability of correctly pronouncing this 
sentence. Given a correspondingly great number of successful performances 
of correctly pronouncing the sentence, we will be inclined to ascribe a corre-
sponding ability to the speaker. Premise P1 does not say more; but it also 
does not say less. 
Premise P1 should, however, not be understood as saying that there are 
only abilities if they are performed regularly. It is certainly imaginable that 
there are certain abilities which under favorable conditions, if at all, can only 
be performed once in a lifetime (for example, being courageous when saving 
someone’s life). The premise P1, moreover, is implicitly accepted by Stanley 
and Williamson.30 They accept that performing an action F implies that the 
person who performs it also knows how one performs the action, but only if 
the actions in question are intentional actions. So Stanley and Williamson 
accept premise P1, although, unlike myself, they accept the truth of the prem-
ise A1. The acceptance of P1 thus appears to be independent of the accep-
tance or rejection of A1. 
6. Premise P2: Knowledge-That presupposes 
some Kind of Analysis 
Premise P2 formulates a necessary condition for knowledge-that: whoever 
knows that p is the case has also analyzed whether p or not-p is the case. I 
think that this premise states succinctly our epistemic basic intuition ex-
pressed by the Gettier cases that we would not consider a belief that was 
merely accidentally true to be knowledge.31 But how does one advance from 
merely accidentally true belief to a non-accidentally true belief? To arrive at a 
non-accidentally true belief that p is the case, we must firstly analyze in a spe-
cific manner whether p is true or not-p is true.32 This means that we must 
complete some kind of analysis program. This analysis program contains a set 
of analysis acts. But if we want to complete this analysis program successfully 
we must be able to distinguish truth from falsehood at each step of the pro-
gram. For this purpose we must have an ability, a “truth-discriminating capac-
ity.”33 
_____________
30  Stanley/Williamson 2001, 414-415. 
31  Cf. Gettier 1963. 
32  Cf. McGinn 1984, 536 ff. 
33  McGinn 1984, 538. Cf. Lehrer 1990, 5: “This kind of knowledge (sc. knowledge-that; author) 
rests on our capacity to distinguish truth from error” (my italics). For a concept of a truth dis-
criminating capacity in Plato’s Theaetetus see Gonzalez’ paper in this volume. 
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Colin McGinn, who (in accord with Austin and Goldman) represents a 
special version of a reliability theory of knowledge, articulates the idea of this 
type of truth-discriminating capacity as follows: “The guiding idea of the 
theory is simple: to say that a person S is globally reliable with respect to a 
range of propositions is to say that S can discriminate truth from falsehood 
within that range of propositions; global reliability is a capacity to tell the differ-
ence between true propositions and false ones within some given class of 
propositions. We then say that S knows that p just if his (true) belief that p is 
acquired by the exercise of a capacity to discriminate truth from falsehood 
within some relevant class R of propositions.”34 
This ability has to be understood as being realized in very many forms, 
since its object ranges over the spectrum of all propositions. If we examine 
this ability more closely, we can see that it comprises some or all of the fol-
lowing five sub-abilities: 1. the ability to pose questions and to recognize 
possible answers to these questions as appropriate while others are rejected as 
inappropriate (question-based knowledge), 2. the ability to use categories 
appropriately (knowledge of categories), 3. the ability to make judgments 
(judgment knowledge), 4. the ability to complete thinking acts of a more 
complex nature (ability of connecting judgments), and 5. being able to com-
plete physical acts (practical knowledge). 
The mere fact of being able to distinguish true propositions from false 
propositions, however, does not suffice to ascribe a specific knowledge-that 
to someone. It also involves him/her not only having this ability in the rele-
vant case but also him/her having in fact successfully realized it. To know that 
p is the case one, therefore, must in fact have found out that p is the case.35 
Before we can know that p is true, we must first successfully complete the 
truth analysis program with our attention on p. This successfully completed 
analysis program which produces the result that either p or not-p is true, is 
thus the smallest common denominator of what must at least be added to a 
true belief if it is not to be merely accidental.  
The exact nature of the analysis program and the knowledge-howd that is 
required for it depends, however, on the situation: the truth analysis can con-
sist in personally traveling to Rome and going to St. Peter’s Square if one 
wants to know whether it is really true that St. Peter’s is in Rome, or alterna-
tively – to take Goldman’s well-known but extremely artificial example – 
examining the object that looks like a barn from a distance from the inside if 
one wants to distinguish fake barns from real barns.36 But such intentional 
_____________
34  McGinn 1984, 536-537. 
35  Cf. Ryle 1971 (1945/6), 224: “To know a truth I must have discovered … it”; Clark 1963, 48: 
“Knowing implies having found out.” Enskat 1998 and 2005 discusses extensively the idea that 
propositional knowing-that rests on a dispositional knowing-how.  
36  Cf. Goldman 1992, 86 ff. 
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analysis acts are necessary as part of an analysis program not only in the field 
of empirical knowledge, but also in regard to non-empirical knowledge. For 
example, if one wants to know whether 5 + 7 = 12, the relevant analysis pro-
gram consists in calculating the mathematical equation sufficiently often and 
successfully oneself in an appropriate way.37 
7. The Reductio ad absurdum 
How and why do the three premises A1, P1, and P2 together yield a reductio 
ad absurdum? If premise A1 is plausible and true then there should be no 
case in which A1 together with other plausible and true premises leads to 
absurd consequences. Let us take as an example the special case of an act F,
e.g. that Albert Einstein walks from his house to his office in Princeton, im-
plying that he also successfully arrives and has walked sufficiently often and 
successfully in the past from his house to his office. In addition, the following 
two assumptions are made: 
 
Z1: Einstein’s walk from his house to his office is an intentional act F1,
Z2: For all x: If x is an analysis act U, with whose help one can analyze 
whether T or not-T, then x is an intentional act F.
Then, assuming the truth of the three premises A1, P1 and P2, the following 
vicious regress results: 
 
(1) Einstein walks from his house to his office.  [assumption] 
(2) Einstein F1-s.     [1, Z1] 
(3) Einstein knows how to F1. [2, P1] 
(4 Einstein knows that T(F1).   [3, A1] 
(5) Einstein completed analysis act U1. [4, P2] 
(6) Einstein F2-s.     [5, Z2] 
(7) Einstein knows how to F2. [6, P1] 
(8) Einstein knows that T(F2).   [7, A1] 
(9) Einstein completed analysis act U2. [8, P2] 
(10) Einstein F3-s.     [9, Z2] 
and so on and so forth.  
 
Thus if premises P1 and P2 are accepted and it is also assumed that A1 is 
true, the result is a vicious regress so that the act F1 never could have oc-
_____________
37  The premise P2 is at least implicitly contained in internalist interpretations of the classic third 
condition of knowledge, the justification condition.  
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curred. But that is absurd, for according to our assumption Einstein in fact 
does walk from his house to his office. Since we presuppose that premises P1 
and P2 are true, premise A1 must therefore be false. Consequently, it is not 
the case that dispositional knowledge-howd is a species of knowledge-that. 
8. Knowledge-That: a Species of Knowledge-Howd
If A1 is false, A2, A4 or A5 can still be true (except A3, which is false if A1 is 
false). But someone, who holds premises P1 and P2 to be true, must also hold 
A2 to be true. For P2 states that someone who knows that p is the case has 
also analyzed whether p or not-p is the case sufficiently often, regularly, suc-
cessfully and intentionally. And P1 states that someone who regularly and 
successfully completes the intentional act F (which he earlier has sufficiently 
often, regularly and successfully completed) also knowsd how act F is com-
pleted. If the analysis of whether p or not-p is the case is itself an intentional 
act F (let’s call this premise G), then this act presupposes a knowledge-howd.
All of this leads to the following hypothetical syllogism: 
 
(P2) If S knows that p, then S has completed sufficiently often, regularly 
and successfully the intentional analysis act U, whether T is the case, 
or whether not-T is the case.   [A  B] 
(G) If S has completed sufficiently often, regularly and successfully the 
intentional analysis act U, whether T is the case, or whether not-T is 
the case, then S has completed sufficiently often, regularly and suc-
cessfully an intentional act F(p).   [B  C] 
(P1) If S has completed sufficiently often, regularly and successfully an in-
tentional act F(p), then S knowsd how to complete an intentional act 
F(p).      [C  D] 
Therefore, (A2) If S knows that p, then S knowsd how to complete an in-
tentional act F(p).    [A  D] 
 
Hence, someone who holds P1, P2 and G true must also hold A2 true. But if 
A2 is true, dispositional knowledge-howd and propositional knowledge-that 
have neither an intersection nor are they completely distinct. As a conse-
quence, A4 and A5 are false. Hence A1, A3, A4 and A5 are false, A2 is true. 
Dispositional knowledge-howd is a necessary condition for propositional 
knowledge-that, and propositional knowledge-that is a species or subcategory 
of dispositional knowledge-howd.
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9. Conclusion 
Let us summarize the results of my considerations: It has been shown that 
there are two types of knowledge-how: the first kind depends on proposi-
tional knowledge-that (knowledge-howp), and the second kind is a non-
propositional form of knowledge-how in the sense of a disposition or ability 
(knowledge-howd). Moreover, the species-of-knowledge argument helped to 
demonstrate that dispositional and non-propositional knowledge-howd, and 
not knowledge-that, is basic for our concept of knowledge. Examined more 
carefully, it was also shown that the dispositional knowledge-howd is a neces-
sary condition for knowledge-that, hence knowledge-that is a species of the 
dispositional knowledge-howd. And finally, it has been shown that the relation 
between both specified forms of knowledge can be determined without pre-
supposing in advance a complete and thoroughly accepted definition of pro-
positional knowledge-that or dispositional knowledge-howd.
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